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"AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAS COME" WILL IT GO?

BUT WHERE

Jane C. Ginsburg
Replying to Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protectionfor Products of the
Mind: An "Idea" Whose Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703 (2006).

This Reply picks up where Professor Miller's bold proposal leaves
off: with the private international law and international copyright implications of state common law protection for idea-submitters. We will
first address the compatibility of the proposal with international copyright norms disqualifying ideas from copyright protection. We will
then turn to the consequences of the proposal for a federal system.
Professor Miller's article thoroughly examines one aspect of the federalism problem, that of federal copyright policy preemption of statebased idea protection. But in advocating a regime constricted to the
fifty separate states, not all of whose courts choose to secure idea submissions (and if they do, the scope of their coverage may diverge), the
proposal raises implementation problems inherent in the territorial
scope of the right. Given those problems, federal statutory coverage of
idea-submitters might seem preferable. That in turn raises the question whether, assuming protection of the kind Professor Miller advocates is a good idea, Congress has power to enact it.
I. INTERNATIONAL NORMS

Both the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property and the World Intellectual Property
Organization Copyright Treaty specify that copyright protection shall
not extend to ideas.' These multilateral agreements thus express a policy that ideas shall remain free for all to adopt, implement, dispute, or
exploit. The policy applies to each treaty member's treatment of authors from other treaty countries; the international conventions do not
purport to prescribe the level of protection members must accord their

Morton L. Janklow Professor of Literary and Artistic Property Law, Columbia Law School.
Thanks to Professors Graeme Austin and Robert A. Gorman, and to my colleagues Clarisa Long,
George Bermann, and Barbara Black.
1 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 2, Dec. 20, Igg6, 36 I.L.M.
65 (1997) [hereinafter WCT]; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of International Property
Rights art. 9(2), Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS]. These agreements echo 17
U.S.C. § I02(b) (2000).
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own authors. 2 Thus, the United States may not protect foreign residents' ideas, even if it would protect those of its own idea-devisers. 3
This prohibition would extend to the federated components of the national treaty member.4 At first blush, this seems to indicate that neither the United States nor the separate states would be able to offer
foreigners the same incentives for ingenuity that animate Professor
Miller's argument for idea protection. U.S. entrepreneurs might, accordingly, miss out on potentially lucrative idea submissions, for foreign idea-submitters otherwise attracted by the resources U.S. companies might invest in their ideas will turn elsewhere. 5
On further analysis, however, foreign idea-submitters should not
encounter treaty barriers to the kind of protection Professor Miller
urges. This is because, as An Idea's preemption discussion makes
clear, Professor Miller does not propose to create a property right enforceable against the world. 6 Rather, the right would be (implied) contract-based, enforceable only against the idea-submittee. Persons who
independently generate the same idea, or who learn of it under conditions not characterizing the relationship that gives rise to the proposed
protection, encounter no liability if they subsequently exploit it. The
same features of the proposal that save it from federal preemption
should also safeguard it from international treaty incompatibility
Whether a foreign idea-submitter would in fact be protected in
whichever of the fifty states adopted the proposed protection would
depend on whether, as a matter of that state's principles of private international law, it accorded foreign residents the same protection as lo-

2 See, e.g., WCT, supra note i, art. 3; TRIPS, supra note i, art. 1(3); Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5.3, Sept. 9, 1886, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, 1I6I
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention].

3
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SAM

RICKETSON & JANE C.

GINSBURG,

INTERNATIONAL

NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND

COPYRIGHT AND
6.ilo-6.iII (2006)

(exploring the proposition that the Berne Convention imposes a ceiling as well as a floor on international copyright protection).
4 See TRIPS, supra note i, art. i(i) ("Members shall be free to determine the appropriate
method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.")
5 See Arthur R. Miller, Common Law Protectionfor Products of the Mind: An "Idea" Whose
Time Has Come, 119 HARV. L. REV. 703, 713-14 (2006) ("[B]ecause ideas have no geographic

boundaries, the protections America accords must be sufficient to ensure that domestic ideavendors are comfortable peddling their wares at home and that foreign ones direct their creative
efforts to the United States rather than to countries with more protective legal regimes.").
6 See, e.g., id. at 732 (arguing that protection should not "give the plaintiff a monopoly power
or create an anticompetitive effect"); id. at 733 (objective is "protecting ideas without creating
monopolies"); id. at 763-64 (federal law preempts "monopolistic property rights," but the proposed
idea submission right is not that kind of right); id. at 772 (characterizing proposed protection as
"contractual obligations"); id. at 778 (whether state law confers equivalent of a monopoly depends
both on the "range of parties against whom [the claim] can be enforced, [and] on the degree of
control that the law affords").
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cals. The rule of national treatment is a mainstay of international
copyright protection,7 but it applies only to subject matter whose coverage the treaties require. With respect to idea-submission claims, by
contrast, we are in the broader realm of contract law, and assuming no
separate state declines to enforce an obligation expressly or implicitly
entered into with a foreign resident, then a British, Egyptian, or Korean idea-submitter should be able to claim the same coverage as an
ingenious American.
II. APPLICABLE STATE LAW(S)
But what is that coverage? Here we encounter the more elusive
problem of domestic conflict of laws. Unless the highest courts of all
fifty states follow Professor Miller's prescriptions and not only determine to protect idea-submitters, but also to protect them to the same
extent, there will be some states in which the submitter will be less
protected than others, and some in which she will not be protected at
all. Which state's law will apply to the idea-submission relationship?
We are positing that there is no written idea-submission agreement;
the problem Professor Miller seeks to redress, after all, arises because
idea-submitters generally cannot obtain written agreements from the
submittee to compensate the submitter if the idea is used. As a result,
there is no choice of law clause to guide us to the applicable rule. This
means that, to determine the law that governs the relationship, the relationship would have to be "localized," but where? At the place
where the idea was disclosed? At the residence of the idea-submitter?
At the headquarters of the business to which the claimant pitched the
idea?
The first of these points of attachment finds support in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, whose section 188(3) provides
that if the place of negotiation and of performance of the contract are
the same, "the local law of this state will usually be applied." In the
case of an idea submission, the negotiation and the "performance" here, the disclosure of the idea - would occur in the same place if, as
may have been traditional, the submitter pitched her idea to defendant's personnel at defendant's place of business. Where, as may inSee, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note 2, art. 5(2); RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note

3,

6.74-6.97. See generally TRIPS, supra note i, art. 3.
See, e.g., Wright v. Sony Pictures Entm't, Inc., 394 F. Supp. 2d 27 (D.D.C. 2005) (localizing
contract at place where contract was negotiated, signed, and substantially performed), discussed
in Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2005: Nineteenth Annual
Survey, 53 AM. J. COMP. LAW (forthcoming 2006), available at http://www.willamette.edu/
wucl/wlo/conflicts/index.htm; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (Ig7)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (discussing "law governing in absence of effective choice by the parties" and the localizing factors to take into account).

8

68

HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 119:65

creasingly be the case, the pitching and the disclosure no longer take
place in a terrestrial office, but over the Internet (or even over the telephone), then these factors may be less pertinent.9
The second point of attachment is probably atypical10 but avoids
the problem of multiple locations. It has the additional advantage of
giving effect to a particular state's determination to adopt Professor
Miller's proposal in the hope that local protection will encourage innovators to reside in that state. It bears emphasis that a different choice
of law rule, for example, one that looks to the place of the submittee's
business, would in practice sidestep the submitter-favorable policy of
the plaintiff's residence (unless the state of the submittee's business
also protected idea-submitters).
The last of these points of attachment serves in the analogous area

of trade secrets," in which the law of the place where the secret is
used generally governs. 12 Professor Miller's substantive focus on the
"defendant's gain"13 mirrors the trade secret courts' attention to the
place "where the benefit was obtained," 14 and supports applying the
law of the state of the defendant's headquarters, for that is where the
defendant will have reaped the gain that justifies the claim. But were
the choice of law rule to designate the submittee's place of business,
one might anticipate that idea-submittees hoping to avoid obligations

9 Cf RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 188 Cmt. 2(e) (place of negotiation contact "is of less importance when there is no one single place of negotiation and agreement, as, for example, when
the parties do not meet but conduct their negotiations from separate states by mail or telephone").
10 The parties' domicile or residence are factors under § r88(2)(e), but "their significance depends largely ... upon the extent to which they are grouped with other contacts." Id. Thus,
making the plaintiff's residence the sole point of attachment, when that state is neither the place
of negotiation nor performance, may be incompatible with the Restatement's general direction to
apply the law with "the most significant relationship to the transaction." Id. § 188(1).
11 See Miller, supra note 5, at 734-37, 766-67 (discussing commonalities between idea submission claims and trade secrets).
12 See, e.g., Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3 d 1132, II40 (iith Cir. 2005) ("In a trade secret

misappropriation case, the lex loci delicti is not the place where the information was learned, but
where the tortious act of misappropriation and use of the trade secret occurred." (citing Salsbury
Labs., Inc. v. Merieux Labs., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1555, 1568 (M.D. Ga. 1989))). As a practical matter, however, the choice of law problem may rarely arise, in part because the disclosure of trade
secrets often occurs through a licensing process that includes a choice of law clause, and in part
because there is little substantive difference across states since forty-five states adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1985).
13 Miller, supra note 5, at 734-37.
14 See, e.g., Wilson v. Electro Marine Sys., Inc., gr5 F.2d TIio, iii5

( 7 th Cir. 19go) (stating
that "in misappropriation of trade secrets cases, the law of the place where the alleged wrong was
committed or benefit was obtained applies" and applying the law of New York because that was
where the defendant "maintains its principal place of business . .. and would have obtained any
benefit"); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, § 221(2) (listing factors to determine law applicable to an action for restitution, including "the place where the benefit or enrichment was received").
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might (all other things being equal1 5 ) seek to locate themselves in jurisdictions that have not adopted the proposed protection. In that
case, any claim might be wholly fruitless. On the other hand, if Professor Miller is correct that idea submission protection will provide an
incentive to generate and propose potentially lucrative ideas, then
businesses seeking those benefits should be willing to pay for them and
would situate themselves in states that have adopted the proposed
coverage.
Suppose, however, a business wants it both ways: to attract ideasubmitters but to avoid paying them. Would common law idea protection end up causing entrepreneurs to reverse course, from declining to
sign any agreements with idea-submitters to requiring that ideasubmitters sign waivers before submitting their ideas? Assuming the
waivers are enforceable, 16 any protection the state accorded would easily be circumvented.
As a common law right, then, protection for idea submissions, even
if not waived, encounters the difficulties inherent in a federal system,
in which nationally exploitable intellectual subject matter receives potentially inconsistent (or nonexistent) application across the fifty states.
Even if the disclosure can be confined to a single state, the exploitation
of the disclosed idea will almost always be interstate (if not international). This means that an idea-protecting state's law may well produce effects in other states, if the remedy takes account of that extraterritorial exploitation.
Professor Miller's proposal tempers the
potential extra-state impact because he would not award injunctive relief to an aggrieved idea-submitter. 1 Rather, he would limit the ideasubmitter's remedy to "'the value of what was received' by the ideadeveloper."" But it is not clear how that value would be calculated.
Professor Miller acknowledges that the idea-exploiter may add some
(or much) of the value 9 but does not detail how to evaluate the ideasubmitter's respective contribution, once identified. If, at least under
15 A proposition perhaps more theoretical than probable.
16 There may be a question whether the waiver is supported by any consideration: Is "I'll listen to you if you disclose your idea" sufficient consideration for waiving any rights to compensation if the listened-to idea is used? On the other hand, the submitter has no entitlement to importune the submittee, who has no obligation to listen to the idea in the first place.
17 See Miller, supra note 5, at 767 (arguing that claims for injunctive relief should be preempted); id. at 776 ("A successful quantum meruit claimant could neither enjoin the use of his
work nor acquire an exclusive right to benefit from that use . . . .").
18 Id. at 776 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 155 (1937)); cf Davis v. The Gap,
Inc., 246 F.3 d 152 (2d Cir. 2001) (declining to award copyright infringer's profits and limiting
remedy to fee plaintiff would have charged had defendant sought a license).
19 Miller, supra note 5, at 723 & n.8I, 742-43; cf Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc., 772 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1985) (awarding copyright damages by parsing profits attributable to
underlying infringed musical works (songs from Kismet), as opposed to profits attributable to
other aspects of defendant's musical revue).
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some circumstances,20 the compensation takes the form of royalties
from the exploitation, and the exploitation extends beyond the state
whose law applies to the idea submission transaction, then the plaintiff
may in effect reap rewards from activity conducted in a state that has
not chosen to protect idea submissions.
On the other hand, the potentially extraterritorial nature of the
damages award may be a false problem if one conceives of the law of
idea submissions as regulating a relationship between two parties,
rather than as granting rights in ideas as such. Let's start with a scenario in which two parties unmistakably agree to share the fruit of one
party's exploitation of the other's idea. That agreement should be enforceable wherever the idea is carried out. Outside the state in which
the exploiter's business is located, the states in which the exploitation
is occurring have no particular interest in invalidating an agreement
that binds no one other than its parties. Professor Miller identifies two
policies behind common law courts' refusal to protect idea-submitters:
maintaining the free flow of ideas, and protecting entrepreneurs
against sham claims.21 If the claim neither seeks nor achieves a monopoly in a disclosed idea, because the submitter has no rights to enforce against anyone other than the submittee, the first concern should
be allayed. As to the second, if the entrepreneur has agreed to compensate the submitter, then it is hard to see how another state's solicitude to insulate entrepreneurs against spurious claims has any relevance.
Professor Miller's scenario differs from ours in that his contractual
relationship is implicit rather than explicit. Drawing on the equitable
principles of quantum meruit,22 Professor Miller would create a constructive agreement out of the "special relationship" 2 3 that arises between an idea-submitter and an entrepreneur who gains value from
implementing the submission. If a state adopts Professor Miller's proposal, then it will have determined for its resident entrepreneurs that
the circumstances giving rise to the constructive agreement adequately
safeguard both their security and the broader interests in freedom of
ideas. At that point, the same inquiry into the interests of states other
than those in which the relationship is grounded would pertain and
should lead us to conclude that one state's adoption of Professor
Miller's proposal should not tread on another state's interests.24

20 See Miller, supra note 5, at 776 (when idea-recipient obtained the idea through "consciously
tortuous conduct" (quoting RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, supra note I8,
21 See Miller, supra note 5, at 720-23.
22 Id. at 773-78.
23 Id. at 774.

§ 152)).

24 This analysis assumes that the applicable law would be that of the state in which the submittee resides. If the court applies a different law, say that of the submitter's residence, and that
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Although Professor Miller's proposal avoids creating policy conflicts across the fifty states, the common law nature of idea submission
protection still means that, unless or until all the states follow An
Idea's prescription, coverage will be inconsistent, with similarly situated idea-submitters receiving different (or no) protection, most likely
depending on the residence of the companies to which they pitch their
ideas. If the need to protect idea-submitters is as great as Professor
Miller claims,25 then perhaps Congress should step in to provide uniform coverage. This brings us to our last inquiry: Congress's power to
enact such a statute.
III. CONGRESS'S AUTHORITY TO PROTECT IDEASUBMITTERS

The two most likely sources of congressional authority are the Patent-Copyright Clause, addressing the "Writings" of "Authors," 26 and
the Commerce Clause, covering interstate and international commerce. 27 For two reasons, however, the Patent-Copyright Clause
might not be the appropriate locus of power. First, a pitched idea may
not qualify as a "Writing." If the idea is communicated orally, and has
not previously been written down, it is not "fixed," and prior fixation
may be a prerequisite to characterization as a "Writing." 28 Moreover,
were an idea (as opposed to its particular "expression"2 9) a "Writing,"
and thus protectable subject matter, the resulting federal monopoly
might be inconsistent with the Patent-Copyright Clause's policy authorizing Congress to "secur[e]" authors' "exclusive Right" in order "to
promote the Progress of Science," a goal achieved by ensuring the free
flow of ideas.30 Second, if as Professor Miller contends, the subject
matter of protection is not the idea itself, but the idea-submission relationship, whose enforcement does not give rise to exclusive rights, then
the Patent-Copyright Clause would offer no authority for Congress's
regulation in any event. Against these objections, one might contend
that Congress's power to promote the progress of science is not limited
to granting a monopoly; Congress might achieve that end by securing

law is more protective of submitters than the law of the submittee's residence, then the latter's
interests may be trodden upon.
25

See id. at 711-15.

art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Id. cl. 3.
28 See KISS Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int'l Prods., No. CV 03-8514 DSF (CWx), 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 37671, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2005) (stating that fixation is a constitutional requirement); United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d 413, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (same).
29 See Miller, supra note 5, at 715-16 & nn.46-48.
30 See, e.g., N.Y. Univ. Law Review, The Meaning of "Writings" in the Copyright Clause of the
Constitution,in STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 43, 69 (Arthur Fisher Mem. Ed. 1963).
26 U.S. CONST.
27
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lesser rights. Moreover, fostering idea-disclosure would also seem to
promote the progress of "Science" because the subject matter, even if
not itself a "Writing" or a "Discovery," is akin to them and could become one or the other if successfully developed by the submittee.3 1
Whether or not the Patent-Copyright Clause authorizes federal protection, the Commerce Clause also seems a probable candidate because
Congress would be regulating a relationship whose fruits impact interstate or international commerce. 32 This should suffice, but recent caselaw and commentary addressing the relationship of the PatentCopyright and Commerce Clauses33 may complicate the inquiry.
When Congress acts under the Commerce Clause to protect subject
matter that is explicitly or implicitly excluded from the scope of the
Patent-Copyright Clause, 34 or provides a scope of protection in excess
of that allowed by that clause,3 5 the policies underlying the Copyright
Clause may well constrain Congress's ability to enact under the Commerce Clause laws impermissible under the Patent-Copyright Clause.3 6
Whether or not Congress is barred from enacting copyright-like legislation under the Commerce Clause (either simply because that legislation
exceeds a limitation contained in the Copyright Clause, or at least when
that limitation expresses a basic public policy that should not be cir31 One might thus argue that idea submission protection is permissible under the Necessary
and Proper Clause as well. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
32 For a recent statement of Congress's broad authority to enact legislation pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, see Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2205 (2005) ("Our case law firmly estab-

lishes Congress's power to regulate [even] purely local activities that are part of an economic
'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce." (citations omitted)).
33 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 28; Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the
Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Restraint on Congress, 2000 U.
ILL. L. REV. Ing (contending that Copyright Clause exclusion of certain subject matter should
preempt Commerce Clause coverage). But see Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and
Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272 (2004) (rejecting cross-clause preemption argu-

ments).
34 Unfixed works may be explicitly excluded, see United States v. Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d
413, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), while facts and ideas are implicitly excluded, see, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Servs. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (199).

35 For example, a law providing perpetual protection despite the Patent-Copyright Clause's
restriction to "limited Times." See, e.g., cases cited supra note 28.
36 While strong public policy reasons underlie the exclusion of ideas, so that copyright-like legislation under the Commerce Clause protecting ideas might indeed seem an impermissible "end
run" around the Patent-Copyright Clause's limitations, the same cannot be said for the fixation
requirement. If the fixation requirement were fundamental to the copyright system, one would expect that unfixed works should remain free from any protection, state or federal; that the limitation,
like the idea/expression distinction, would define not only what may be protected but also what
must not be protected. See Robert A. Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implicationsfor Copyright, 29 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 56o, 604 (1982) (contending that § I02(b) implicitly precludes state law protection for elements excluded from federal protection). However, that is not the case. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 30i(b)(I)

(2000) (preserving state law protection of unfixed works). Thus, one may wonder why a

limitation that does not compel the "vertical preemption" of state coverage would nonetheless mandate the "horizontal preemption" of one constitutional clause by another.
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cumvented by the mere sleight of hand of shifting Article I, Section 8
clauses), it is not necessary in this case to enter the inter-clause preemption debate3 7 because An Idea does not propose copyright-like protection. Nor is it advocating coverage that might retain the form of a contract, but through serial adhesion agreements would function like a
generally-assertable property right.38
CONCLUSION
This Reply has not challenged the initial premise of Professor
Miller's article, that protection for idea submissions is necessary to our
information-drenched economy. The protection Professor Miller advocates may well stimulate communication of promising commercial ideas
to entrepreneurs who will appropriately compensate their ingenious confidantes. Whether we now suffer a dearth of idea submissions, or
whether protecting submitted ideas will cause them not only to be fruitful (to their submitters) but to multiply (in their disclosure), are propositions that may be impossible to prove.3 9 This may be why Professor
Miller also grounds his arguments in fundamental fairness: "[T]he basic
idea .

.

. is that it is inequitable for one party to receive a benefit from

another without paying for it . . . ."40 Sensitive to that instinct's risk of
overbroad application, Professor Miller emphasizes that in most instances in which the requisite "special relationship" is present, the measure of damages would not be calculated as a percentage of profits from
the successful implementation of the idea, but would constitute a kind
of fee for services. 41 In effect, the idea pitcher to whose importuning
the entrepreneur agreeably submits would be entitled to the same payment as the business consultant whose advice the entrepreneur deliberately seeks out. In the former case, the idea supplier comes to the entrepreneur; in the latter, the entrepreneur goes to the idea supplier.
There is no reason the suppliers should be treated differently, at least so
long as the unsought submission is willingly received and implemented.

37 Compare Martignon, 346 F. Supp. 2d at 425 (holding that Congress may not legislate under
the Commerce Clause that which it could not under the Patent-Copyright Clause), with KISS
Catalog, Ltd. v. Passport Int'l Prods., No. CV 03-8514 DSF (CWx), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37671,
at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2005) (holding that the Copyright Clause does not constrain Congress's
power to legislate with respect to subject matter falling outside the scope of the Patent-Copyright
Clause).
38 See Miller, supra note 5, at 77o-7.

39

Cf Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photo-

copies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 293-313 (1Q70) (noting that whether copy-

right serves as an incentive to create and disseminate works of authorship remains unproven).
40 Miller, supra note 5, at 773.
41 Id. at 775-76.

